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Abstract. Kin selection theorists argue that evolution in social contexts
will lead organisms to behave as if maximizing their inclusive, as opposed
to personal, fitness. The inclusive fitness concept allows biologists to treat
organisms as akin to rational agents seeking to maximize a utility function.
Here we develop this idea and place it on a firm footing by employing a stan-
dard decision-theoretic methodology. We show how the principle of inclusive
fitness maximization and a related principle of quasi-inclusive fitness max-
imization can be derived from axioms on an individual’s ‘as if preferences’
(binary choices) for the case in which phenotypic effects are additive. Our
results help integrate evolutionary theory and rational choice theory, help
draw out the behavioural implications of inclusive fitness maximization, and
point to a possible way in which evolution could lead organisms to implement
it.
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1. Introduction
A central tenet of inclusive fitness theory is that a trait may be selected for
even if it involves some sacrifice to an individual’s personal fitness, provided
that it sufficiently enhances the reproductive success of genetically related
individuals. Genetic relatedness between social partners can arise for various
reasons, in particular kinship. Inclusive fitness is central to much work on
the evolution of social behaviour. It has been used to understand diverse
biological phenomena including sex-ratios, co-operative breeding, dispersal,
reproductive skew, group formation, and more. For introductions to inclusive
fitness theory, see Frank (1998), McElreath and Boyd (2007), or Wenseleers,
Gardner, and Foster (2010).
J. B. S. Haldane purportedly enunciated the basic idea of inclusive fitness
theory in a pub when he quipped that he would sacrifice himself by jumping
into a river to save two brothers or eight cousins, a view he only later ex-
pressed in print (see Haldane (1955, p. 44)). However, it was W. D. Hamilton
(1963, 1964a,b) who first provided a precise formal statement of the theory.
In addition to Haldane (1955), other precursors to Hamilton include Darwin
(1859), Fisher (1930), and Haldane (1932) (see Dugatkin (2007)).
Hamilton’s original theory contains two distinct though related ideas:
firstly, his famous rule for when a gene coding for an altruistic action will
be favoured by natural selection; and secondly the idea of inclusive fitness,
as opposed to personal fitness, as the quantity that individuals will behave
as if they are trying to maximize. Hamilton’s Rule is expressed by the in-
equality rb > c. This rule tells us that a gene for altruism will spread so
long as the cost c to the altruist is offset by a sufficient amount of benefit b
to relatives who are sufficiently close, as measured by the relatedness coeffi-
cient r. This way of thinking involves taking the ‘gene’s eye view’, that is,
looking for the selective advantage that a trait has for the gene that causes
the trait, rather than the individual that expresses it. However, Hamilton
showed that altruistic behaviour can also be understood from an individual’s
perspective. Though an individual performing an altruistic action will re-
duce its personal fitness (i.e. expected number of offspring), it may enhance
its inclusive fitness—a measure that also takes into account the effect of the
action on the reproductive output of relatives. Under certain conditions, it
can be shown that natural selection will lead an individual to behave as if it
is trying to maximize its inclusive fitness (see Frank, 1998; McElreath and
Boyd, 2007; Grafen, 2006, 2009).
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The concept of inclusive fitness is somewhat unintuitive, and critics have
questioned both the generality of the theory and the usefulness of the con-
cept (e.g., Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson, 2010). (Birch (2014) provides an
illuminating discussion of the arguments for and against the claims made by
Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson (2010).) While granting that inclusive fitness
has its limitations, and that there are other valid ways to study the evolu-
tion of social behaviour, here we focus on a conceptually attractive feature
of inclusive fitness theory, namely that it allows us to preserve the idea of
the individual organism as a quasi-rational agent, choosing between alter-
native actions according to the criterion of maximal inclusive fitness. This
aspect of the theory explains its wide appeal to behavioural ecologists as it
allows them to take an adaptationist approach to social behaviour, as has
been emphasized in recent work by Grafen (2006, 2009) and Gardner, West,
and Wild (2011), among others.
In this article, we offer a novel perspective on inclusive fitness theory by
applying tools from the economic theory of rational choice. Our aim is to
derive inclusive fitness maximization from axioms on an individual organ-
ism’s choice behaviour for the case in which phenotypic effects are additive.
Consider a focal individual and the set of other individuals who might be
affected by this individual’s actions. At a given point in time, each of the
latter individuals stands in a given relatedness relationship to the focal indi-
vidual. The focal individual is faced with a choice between alternative social
actions. Each action leads to a payoff (which could be positive, negative,
or zero) for the focal individual and each of the other affected individuals.
An individual’s payoff is the incremental change in its personal fitness due
to the focal individual’s action. The focal individual’s choice behaviour is
described by a binary preference relation on the set of actions. This relation
specifies, for any two actions, which the focal individual would choose; in
principle, this choice could be directly observed. The question we pose is:
What conditions must this binary relation satisfy such that the focal individ-
ual always behaves as if it were trying to maximize its inclusive fitness? We
also consider a variant of inclusive fitness maximization called quasi-inclusive
fitness maximization that can be applied when the focal individual is unable
to determine the exact degree of relatedness to some of the other individuals,
and axiomatically characterize this behaviour as well.
The axiomatic approach employed here is the standard way of justifying
a maximization assumption in rational choice theory, and it is instructive
to apply it to inclusive fitness for three reasons. Firstly, it offers a novel
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way of forging links, both formal and conceptual, between social evolution
theory and economic theory. Many authors have drawn attention to the anal-
ogy between the utility-maximizing paradigm of economics and the fitness-
maximizing paradigm of behavioural ecology; here we develop this analogy
in a precise way by finding the behavioural conditions that are necessary and
sufficient for an organism to be representable as an inclusive fitness maxi-
mizer. Our results draw on related work in social choice theory, which is the
branch of rational choice theory that is concerned with social preferences.
Axiomatic social choice theory has been used by Okasha (2009) and Bossert,
Qi, and Weymark (2013a,b) to evaluate alternative measures of group fitness
in hierarchically structured populations. This article is the first to apply this
methodology to analyzing inclusive fitness.
Secondly, our results suggest a possible route by which evolution could
program organisms to implement inclusive fitness maximization, or some-
thing close to it. That is, the axioms we use to characterize inclusive fitness
maximization could be viewed as heuristic rules by which evolution might in-
duce organisms to display optimal behaviour in social settings without having
to consciously perform inclusive fitness calculations.
Thirdly, our results help bring out the behavioural implications of in-
clusive fitness theory, and could thus facilitate its empirical testing. An
organism’s binary choices between actions can be directly observed, whereas
the consequences of those choices for inclusive fitness are typically difficult to
determine. If it could be shown that an organism’s choice behaviour violated
one of the axioms below, we could immediately infer that the organism was
not maximizing inclusive fitness.
Our model is not evolutionary; rather it is behavioural. Our aim is to
characterize mathematically a certain pattern of behaviour that organisms
might exhibit, namely inclusive fitness maximization, in terms of the prop-
erties of a binary preference relation. We do not assert that the evolutionary
process will necessarily lead organisms to exhibit the behaviour in question,
nor that it will ‘tend’ to do so, nor that the behaviour, if it evolves, will be
stable against mutation; and we do not study the conditions under which
an allele coding for the behaviour will be favoured by natural selection. To
address these questions would require constructing an explicit evolutionary
model and studying its evolutionary dynamics. There is a large literature
addressing these questions, and we are not attempting to contribute to it.
Rather, our aim is different, namely to supply an alternative mathematical
characterization of inclusive fitness maximizing behaviour.
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Section 2 describes the formal framework employed here. Our axioms are
introduced in Section 3. Our axiomatic characterizations of the two forms
of inclusive fitness maximization are presented in Section 4. We discuss the
significance of our results in Section 5. The proofs of our theorems may be
found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a set of individuals I = {1, . . . , n}. Individual 1 is the focal
individual whose actions we are interested in; the other n−1 comprise all the
other individuals who might be affected by the focal individual’s actions. We
let ri ∈ R denote the relatedness of the focal individual to individual i, with
higher values denoting a closer degree of relatedness, where r1 = 1. Thus,
the set I has an associated relatedness profile r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ 1×Rn−1. At
a particular point in time, the profile r is taken as given. (However we make
no assumption about what determines r; it may have ecological as well as
genealogical determinants.) If relatedness depends on the evolving trait, then
at a subsequent point in time the relatedness profile r will be different; and
our analysis will apply again at that later time modulo the new relatedness
profile.
In Hamilton’s original papers, relatedness was defined as the probability
that actor and recipient share genes that are ‘identical by descent’, which
is determined by their genealogical relationship; this implies that ri ∈ [0, 1].
However later work, by Hamilton and many others, has shown that the re-
latedness that matters to inclusive fitness theory is a more abstract measure
of genetic similiarity (typically, the regression of recipient genotype on ac-
tor genotype); for discussion, see Michod and Hamilton (1980), Frank (1998),
Grafen (2006), or Rousset (2004, chap. 7). This means that, in principle, the
relatedness co-efficient can assume any real value, including negative values,
and is why we assume ri ∈ R rather than ri ∈ [0, 1] for i 6= 1. Our formalism
is deliberately neutral with respect to the precise definition of relatedness
employed, which may be different in different evolutionary models.
At a given point in time, the focal individual can perform a number
of different actions, each of which potentially affects the personal fitness
(expected number of offspring) of every individual in I. We identify an
action with a payoff vector a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn, where ai ∈ R is the
incremental personal fitness gain or loss that individual i suffers as a result
of action a. The set of all possible actions is Rn. There is a fixed status-quo
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payoff vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn+ describing the fitness of each individual
before any action is performed. Thus, the set of feasible actions is given by
F = {a ∈ Rn | a + s ≥ 0} = {a ∈ Rn | a ≥ −s}, where 0 denotes an
n-vector of zeros. There may be further contingent biological restrictions on
the feasible actions in particular cases, but for maximal generality we take
the feasible set to be F .
In common with some inclusive fitness models, including Hamilton’s orig-
inal, we assume that social interactions have additive fitness effects; that is,
the focal individual’s action a adds ai to the fitness of individual i irrespective
of what action individual i may himself perform. This is admittedly a serious
restriction, and one that many modern inclusive fitness models do not make.
Non-additive phenotypic effects are often handled in inclusive fitness theory
by employing weak selection techniques, permitting a Hamilton-type inequal-
ity for allele frequency change to be derived (see Rousset (2004, chap. 7)).
However it is only in the additive case that a convincing demonstration ex-
ists that individuals will behave as if maximizing their inclusive fitness in an
evolutionary equilibrium (see Grafen (2006)). Thus restricting our attention
to additive phenotypic effects on fitness seems reasonable for the purposes
of this paper. Whether this restriction can be dispensed with is discussed in
Section 5.
The focal individual’s choice behaviour is described by a binary preference
relation %r on F . The relation %r indicates, for any two actions in F , which
the focal individual would prefer given the relatedness profile r; formally,
%r is a subset of F × F . As the notation suggests, %r is a weak preference
relation; that is, a %r b means that action a is either strictly preferred or
indifferent to b. From %r, we can define corresponding relations of strict
preference r and of indifference ∼r by letting a r b ≡df [a %r b and
not(b %r a)] and a ∼r b ≡df [a %r b and b %r a]. The concept of preference
being appealed to here is an ‘as if’ one; the preference %r is simply a way of
summarizing the focal individual’s choice behaviour. That is, a r b means
that a is chosen when the options are a and b, whereas a ∼r b means that
either of these actions might be chosen when both are available.
The inclusive fitness of a feasible action a ∈ F is defined as ∑ni=1 riai.
That is, it is a weighted sum over individuals of the action’s payoff to each
individual, with weights given by the relatedness profile. Note that we define
inclusive fitness for actions rather than for individuals, as recommended by
Queller (1996); this corresponds to the ‘inclusive fitness effect’ of Hamilton
(1964a). If the focal individual is an inclusive fitness maximizer, then
6
its preference relation %r is represented by the inclusive fitness function,
which means that for all actions a,b ∈ F , a %r b if and only if
∑n
i=1 riai ≥∑n
i=1 ribi.
If the focal individual is not an inclusive fitness maximizer, this may be
because it cannot discriminate sufficiently precisely between different classes
of relatives. We define a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer as an individ-
ual whose preference relation %r is represented by
∑n
i=1 βiai for some vector
(β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn such that (i) βi > 0 if and only if ri > 0 for all i ∈ I
and (ii) βi > βj if and only if ri > rj for all i, j ∈ I. A quasi-inclusive
fitness maximizer uses a weighted sum of the payoffs to evaluate an action;
however, the weights need not be the true relatednesses but, rather, can be
any sign-preserving monotonic transformation of them.
The concept of quasi-inclusive fitness maximization is interesting for two
different reasons. Firstly, it describes a way that an organism might attempt
to maximize inclusive fitness if it lacks information about exact degrees of
relatedness, but can tell who it is more related to. Empirically, it seems
likely that many organisms are in this situation. Secondly, it highlights
the fact that inclusive fitness maximization comprises two logically separate
components: (i) evaluating social actions by a weighted sum of the payoffs
and (ii) using relatednesses as the weights in the sum. Below, we obtain an
axiomatic separation of these two components of inclusive fitness theory.
Our goal is to identify axioms on %r that characterize the focal individual
as an inclusive fitness maximizer and as a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer.
Some of our axioms are analogues of axioms used in social choice theory to
characterize a weighted utilitarian social objective function (see d’Aspremont
(1985) and Bossert and Weymark (2004)). A weighted utilitarian objective
has the same functional form as the function
∑n
i=1 βiai used to represent a
quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer’s preferences, but with ai interpreted as the
ith individual’s utility and βi as the corresponding social welfare weight. This
functional form can alternatively be interpreted as representing the prefer-
ences of someone who takes account of the interests of others. In this case, it
is natural for the weights to be inversely related to the social distance from
the individual whose preferences are being considered, as in the dominant
loyalties problem of Harsanyi (1977, sec. 2.3).
We have implicitly assumed that the payoffs (i.e., the incremental fit-
nesses) are measurable on an absolute scale. This is a stronger assumption
than is necessary; both inclusive fitness maximization and quasi-inclusive fit-
ness maximization only require that gains and losses of incremental fitness
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are comparable across individuals. The importance of measurement-theoretic
issues for the quantification of fitness has recently been stressed by Wagner
(2010).
3. The Axioms
In this section, we consider a number of axioms that might be imposed on the
relation %r and comment briefly on their meaning and biological significance.
The binary relation %r is (i) reflexive if for all a ∈ F , a %r a, (ii) complete
if for all a,b ∈ F with a 6= b, a %r b or b %r a, and (iii) transitive if for
all a,b, c ∈ F , a %r b and b %r c imply a %r c. An ordering is a reflexive,
complete, and transitive binary relation.
Ordering. %r is an ordering.
Ordering is a standard axiom in the theory of rational choice (see, e.g.,
Kreps (1988) or Bossert and Weymark (2004)). Essentially it requires that
the focal individual can rank all feasible actions in terms of betterness, with
ties permitted. Though violations of transitivity have been reported em-
pirically in both humans and animals, this axiom is a fundamental part of
the meaning of ‘rationality’, and is necessary if an individual’s choices are to
maximize any quantity, inclusive fitness or some other. The reader can easily
verify that if the focal individual’s choice behaviour violates Ordering, then
as a matter of logic, it is not an inclusive fitness maximizer.
The binary relation %r is continuous if for any action a ∈ F , the upper
contour set {b ∈ F | b %r a} and the lower contour set {b ∈ F | a %r b}
are both closed.
Continuity. %r is continuous.
Continuity is also a standard axiom of rational choice theory (again see
Kreps (1988) or Bossert and Weymark (2004)). It formalizes the intuitive
idea that ‘small’ changes in payoffs should not lead to ‘large’ changes in
preference. It is an appropriate assumption in any context where payoffs
cannot be measured with perfect accuracy or are subject to minor chance
fluctuations.
Payoff Dominance. For all a,b ∈ F such that (i) aj > bj for all j ∈ I with
rj ≥ 0 and (2) aj < bj for all j ∈ I with rj < 0, a r b.
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Payoff Dominance says that if one action yields a strictly higher payoff
than another for everyone to whom the focal individual is nonnegatively re-
lated, and a strictly lower payoff for everyone to whom the focal individual
is negatively related, then the former action is strictly preferred. If the focal
individual violated this axiom by choosing a dominated action, then its be-
haviour would seem clearly non-optimal because by simply switching actions,
it would either be able to increase the personal fitness of every individual in
I to whom it is positively related, or to decrease the personal fitness of every
individual to whom it is negatively related. This axiom is closely related
to the ‘Pareto principle’ in social choice theory (see Bossert and Weymark
(2004)).
Focal Individual Monotonicity. For all a,b ∈ F such that a1 > b1 and
aj = bj for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, a r b.
Focal Individual Monotonicity says that starting from any action, if the
focal individual’s payoff is increased while the payoff of all other individuals
is held fixed, then the resulting action is strictly preferred to the original.
Thus, the focal individual is not completely other-regarding; it does care
about its personal fitness. Again, violating this axiom would seem clearly
non-optimal for it would amount to sacrificing one’s personal fitness without
a compensating gain in fitness for anyone else. Such a sacrifice would nec-
essarily reduce inclusive fitness (because personal fitness is a component of
inclusive fitness); so satisfying this axiom is necessary for being an inclusive
fitness maximizer.
Baseline Independence. For all a,b, c ∈ F such that (a + c) ∈ F and
(b + c) ∈ F ,
a r b ⇔ (a + c) r (b + c).
Baseline Independence requires the focal individual’s evaluation of an
action to be independent of the ‘baseline fitnesses’ from which we start; so if
action a is preferred to b, this preference will never be reversed by changing
the baseline. (Note that on the LHS of the above equivalence, the baseline is
the null action 0, whereas on the RHS it is c.) So if an individual prefers a to
b today, it should continue to do so tomorrow, irrespective of what fitness-
affecting events have occurred in the interim. Another interpretation is to
think of (b+c) as the result of performing actions b and c in succession; the
axiom then says that if one action is preferred to another, it should remain
so irrespective of which other actions have already been performed.
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Nepotism. For all a,b ∈ F , for all j, k ∈ I such that rj ≥ rk, and for all
x > 0, if bj = aj + x, bk = ak − x, and bi = ai for all i ∈ I \ {j, k}, then (i)
b r a if rj > rk and (ii) b ∼r a if rj = rk.
Nepotism captures the idea that the focal individual would prefer to help
closer than more distant relatives; this is a central prediction of kin selection
theory. The axiom says that starting from a given action, if some quantity
of payoff is shifted from one individual to another more closely related in-
dividual while everyone else’s payoff is held fixed, then the resulting action
will be preferred; while if payoff is shifted to an equally related individual,
indifference will result. To satisfy Nepotism, all the focal individual needs to
‘know’ is which of any pair of individuals it is more closely related to, but
not by how much. This seems a reasonable idealization of the actual powers
of kin discrimination of many animals.
Haldane. For all a,b ∈ F , if there exist k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and x ∈ R such that
(i) rk 6= 0, b1 = a1−x, bk = ak +x/rk, and bj = aj for all j ∈ I \{1, k} or (ii)
rk = 0, b1 = a1, bk = ak + x, and bj = aj for all j ∈ I \ {1, k}, then a ∼r b.
Haldane provides a formal statement of the idea that starting from a
given action, if we reduce the focal individual’s own payoff by x and increase
the payoff to any other individual i by x
ri
, then indifference is the result; that
is, the focal individual uses relatedness as the ‘exchange rate’ for determining
which payoff sacrifices it is prepared to make. The axiom derives its name
from Haldane’s remark quoted in the Introduction that it would be a fitness-
enhancing sacrifice to jump into a river to save two brothers or eight cousins
when r =
(
1, 1
2
, 1
8
, . . .
)
. Note that this axiom requires only that the focal
individual be able to perform ‘egocentric’ comparisons; that is, it must be
able to compare the results of transferring its own payoff to others. It does
not require comparisons among pairs of actions that involve transfers between
two non-focal individuals (unlike Nepotism). Nonetheless, to satisfy Haldane
is still a demanding task, as it requires that the focal individual ‘knows’ its
degree of relatedness to every other individual in I, and uses this information
to compute the level of self-sacrifice it is prepared to make.
4. The Results
We now use the axioms introduced in the preceding section to provide ax-
iomatic characterizations of inclusive fitness maximization (Theorem 1) and
quasi-inclusive fitness maximization (Theorem 2).
10
Theorem 1. The relation r satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Mono-
tonicity, and Haldane if and only if the focal individual is an inclusive fitness
maximizer.
Theorem 1 states necessary and sufficient conditions for the focal individ-
ual to be an inclusive fitness maximizer, namely that its preference relation
r satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane. It might
be thought that this result is somewhat unexciting on the grounds that the
Haldane axiom is conceptually quite similar to inclusive fitness maximization
itself. However two points should be noted. Firstly, recall that Haldane con-
cerns only ‘egocentric’ comparisons between actions which involve a transfer
of payoff from the focal individual to another individual. The axiom is silent
about how to rank pairs of actions that are not of this sort; yet inclusive
fitness maximization yields a ranking of all actions in the feasible set. So the
conceptual gap between the axioms of Theorem 1 and the characterization
is in fact substantial, and the proof correspondingly non-trivial.
Secondly, note that the Haldane axiom on its own does not suffice to char-
acterize inclusive fitness maximization; the other two axioms of Theorem 1
are also needed. Therefore, the theorem helps to clarify the exact logical
relation between Haldane’s original idea, as formalized here, and Hamilton’s
later theory. Because the two axioms that must be added to Haldane to yield
inclusive fitness maximization (Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity)
are fairly obvious rationality requirements, this vindicates the widely-held
view that Haldane had grasped the essence of inclusive fitness theory prior
to its detailed elaboration by Hamilton.
Theorem 2. The relation r satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Domi-
nance, Baseline Independence, and Nepotism if and only if the focal individual
is a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer.
Theorem 2 characterizes quasi-inclusive fitness maximization using five
axioms that do not include Haldane. As the proof in the Appendix shows,
the first four axioms (Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance, and Base-
line Independence) imply that the focal individual evaluates actions by a
weighted sum of the payoffs for some vector of weights whose signs are the
same as the signs of the corresponding relatedness coefficients; the addition
of Nepotism then restricts these weights to be monotone transformations of
these coefficients. Thus, the first four axioms characterize one component
of inclusive fitness theory—evaluating actions by weighted sums of payoffs,
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while the fifth axiom ensures a logical link with the second component—using
weights that vary positively with relatedness.
Although Theorem 2 only characterizes quasi-inclusive fitness maximiza-
tion, rather than inclusive fitness maximization itself, it has one significant
advantage over Theorem 1, namely, its axioms make weaker informational
demands on the focal individual than does Haldane. Consequently, it should
be correspondingly easier for natural selection to bring about conformity to
them. Recall that Nepotism requires that the focal individual prefers to help
closer than more distant relatives; exact degrees of relatedness do not matter.
Because kin discrimination is quite common in social species, there is no great
difficulty in imagining how natural selection could produce organisms whose
choice behaviour satisfies Nepotism. By contrast, it is rather harder to imag-
ine natural selection fine-tuning choice behaviour so as to satisfy Haldane.
So although Theorem 2 only yields quasi-inclusive fitness maximization, the
axioms it uses are more biologically reasonable.
It is worth commenting on the logical relationship between the axioms
used in our two theorems. Because quasi-inclusive fitness maximization is a
special case of inclusive fitness maximization, the three axioms of Theorem 1
together imply all of the axioms of Theorem 2. The Ordering axiom is
common to both theorems, but as we shall argue, Ordering in combination
with either Focal Individual Monotonicity or Haldane does not imply any of
the non-ordering axioms of Theorem 2.
Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity are not sufficient to exclude
non-continuous orderings such as lexicographic binary relations. Further-
more, they place no restrictions on the monotonicity properties of r with
respect to individuals other than the focal individual, so they do not imply
Payoff Dominance either. In addition, these two axioms do not imply the ad-
ditive structure required by Baseline Independence or the additive trade-offs
employed in Nepotism.
Haldane only applies to comparisons involving the indifference relation
∼r, and so cannot be used in conjunction with Ordering to determine if
the upper and lower contour sets of any action a are closed, as required by
Continuity. Nor do they imply Payoff Dominance, which is concerned with
the strict preference r. Furthermore, these two axioms do not imply the
additive structure required by Baseline Independence. The kind of transfers
between two non-focal individuals considered in Nepotism cannot be repli-
cated by a sequence of transfers of the kind considered by Haldane when
rj 6= rk. Moreover, Haldane makes no claims about the strict preference r,
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so Ordering and Haldane do not imply Nepotism either.
5. Discussion
The popularity of the inclusive fitness concept in evolutionary biology arises
because it allows social behaviour, even when it is individually costly, to be
understood from the perspective of an individual organism ‘trying’ to achieve
a goal, thus preserving Darwin’s insight that selection will lead to the appear-
ance of design in nature. (The goal in question, of course, is maximization
of inclusive fitness.) This has led many authors to see a link between so-
cial evolution and rational choice theory; that is, evolved organisms should
behave like rational agents trying to maximize a utility function, where the
utility function is inclusive fitness (Grafen, 2006; West and Gardner, 2013).
The use of concepts from rational choice theory in evolutionary biology is
widespread, and extends beyond social evolution. To take two well-known ex-
amples, optimal foraging models have often been inspired in part by Bayesian
decision theory (e.g., Houston and McNamara (1980)); while evolutionary
game theory has borrowed liberally from the traditional rationality-based
game theory (see Maynard Smith (1982); Hammerstein (2012)). More re-
cently, there have been attempts to forge links between social choice the-
ory, another branch of rational choice theory, and evolution (Okasha, 2009;
Bossert, Qi, and Weymark, 2013a,b).
At the heart of rational choice theory is the idea of utility maximization
by individuals. However, what is not always appreciated by those who apply
this idea to biology (and others) is that a widely accepted approach to ratio-
nal choice called revealed preference theory (see Kreps (1988)) treats utility
maximization as a strictly ‘as if’ affair. To describe an individual as a utility
maximizer, on this view, is not to speculate about the proximate psychologi-
cal causes of its behaviour, but rather just to say that the individual behaves
as if it were trying to maximize a utility function. Consistent with this be-
haviourist orientation, in revealed preference theory, theorists do not begin
their analysis of individual behaviour by simply writing down a real-valued
utility function; rather they begin with a description of an individual’s choice
behaviour, which can be summarized in the form of a binary preference rela-
tion on a set of alternatives. They then investigate the conditions that this
binary relation must satisfy if it is to be representable by a real-valued utility
function. This methodology enables clear operational meaning to be given
to the hypothesis of utility maximization.
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Our approach has to been apply this methodology to the case of inclu-
sive fitness maximization. To that end, we have sought axioms on a focal
individual’s preference relation over actions (i.e., payoff vectors) which are
necessary and sufficient for this individual to always choose between actions
in a way that maximizes its inclusive fitness. Our hope is that this endeavor
helps elucidate, in a novel and precise way, the connection between social
evolution theory and rational choice theory. By contrast, previous work on
this connection, for example Alan Grafen’s pioneering work on the ‘individ-
ual as a maximizing agent analogy’ (Grafen, 2002, 2006, 2009), does not take
account of the ‘as if’ nature of utility-maximization employed in revealed
preference theory, and so has not employed the behaviourist methodology
used here. The same is true of much other biological work that draws on
rational choice theory.
It is worth explicitly comparing our analysis to Grafen (2006). In that
article, Grafen seeks a firm foundation for the idea, popularly assumed in
behavioural ecology, that as a result of natural selection individuals can be
expected to display inclusive fitness maximizing behaviour. To this end, he
studies a simple model of social behaviour in which individuals play strategies
which have consequences for their own and others’ reproductive fitness, with
the effects on fitness assumed to be additive. Grafen then establishes links
between the evolutionary dynamics and the individuals’ strategic choices.
While these links fall short of showing that selection will always lead to
inclusive fitness maximization (as Grafen acknowledges), they are still signif-
icant; in effect, they show that if all individuals choose the inclusive fitness
maximizing strategy, then a population-genetic equilibrium will obtain. In
the absence of genetic constraints, selection can thus be expected to lead
individuals to maximize their inclusive fitness.
Grafen’s analysis draws on rational choice theory by explicitly modelling
an individual as attempting to solve an optimization problem. He deduces
this individual’s objective function (or utility function) from considerations
of evolutionary stability. This work is valuable, and certainly helps to jus-
tify the behavioural ecologist’s assumption of inclusive fitness maximization.
However, it only goes part way to forging a link between social evolution
and rational choice theory because Grafen’s analysis leaves untouched the
question of what pattern(s) of choice behaviour are necessary and sufficient
for an individual to be representable as an inclusive fitness maximizer. Our
analysis answers this question, and thus complements Grafen’s work. In ef-
fect, Grafen aims to justify the idea that evolution will lead individuals to
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maximize their inclusive fitness; while we aim to show, in terms of observable
choice behaviour, what inclusive fitness maximization actually amounts to.
One outstanding issue is whether our analysis can be extended to deal
with non-additive costs and benefits, thus capturing traits such as the sex-
ratio, dispersal, and more generally phenotypic interactions. Inclusive fitness
models usually deal with phenotypic non-additivity in one of two ways: ei-
ther by invoking weak selection (Rousset, 2004) or by defining the the b and
c terms of Hamilton’s rule as partial regression coefficients rather than as
incremental payoffs (Queller, 1985, 2011; Frank, 1998; Gardner, West, and
Wild, 2011). In principle, the latter approach could be used to define the
actions in our model as our formal analysis assumes only that each action a
is a vector in Rn. However, the usefulness of extending our analysis in this
way is debatable because a satisfactory justification of the idea that individ-
uals maximize their inclusive fitness in non-additive scenarios has not been
given. (It is unclear whether Grafen’s (2006) argument can be generalized to
non-additive cases; see Gardner, West, and Wild (2011) and Lehmann and
Rousset (2014) for conflicting opinions on this issue.)
To conclude, our aim has been to study the connection between rational
choice and social evolution theory and to place it on a secure foundation.
We do this by seeking to deduce inclusive fitness maximization from a more
primitive basis, namely axioms on an individual’s ‘as if preferences’, in accor-
dance with a standard decision-theoretic methodology. Our hope is that this
will shed light on the conceptual links between evolution and rational choice
theory, show a possible route by which natural selection could bring about
inclusive fitness maximization or something close to it, and help to draw out
behavioural implications of inclusive fitness theory that are directly testable.
Appendix
We say that the focal individual is an m-inclusive fitness maximizer , m ∈
{2, . . . , n}, if, for all M ⊆ I such that 1 ∈M and |M | = m,
a r b ⇔
∑
i∈M
riai ≥
∑
i∈M
ribi
for all a,b ∈ F such that aj = bj for all j ∈ I \M . Thus, the focal individual
is an inclusive fitness maximizer if it is an n-inclusive fitness maximizer.
The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1. If the relation r satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonic-
ity, and Haldane, then the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer.
Proof. Consider any k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, M = {1, k}, and a,b ∈ F . Let a′j = aj
for all j ∈ I \ {1, k} and consider the set
L(aj)j∈N\{1,k}(a1, ak) = {(a′1, a′k) | a′ ∈ F and a′ ∼r a},
where a′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
n). This is the level set of the restriction of r corre-
sponding to the set of components {1, k} that contains (a1, ak) conditional
on the remaining variables having the values (aj)j∈N\{1,k}. By subtracting
x = −[rk(sk + ak)] from a1 and adding x/rk to ak when rk 6= 0 or by
adding −(sk + ak) to ak when rk = 0, it follows from Haldane that the
point (a1 + rk(sk + ak),−sk) belongs to this level set.
In order for the focal individual to be a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer, it
is necessary that any point (a′1, a
′
k) in L(aj)j∈N\{1,k}(a1, ak) be such that
a′1 + rka
′
k = a1 + rkak = a1 + rk(sk + ak) + rk(−sk). (1)
Any such point can be reached by subtracting x = a1 + rk(sk + ak) − a′1
from a1 + rk(sk + ak) and adding x/rk to −sk when rk 6= 0 or by adding
sk + a
′
k to −sk when rk = 0. Thus, by Haldane, it follows that any point
(a′1, a
′
k) for which (1) holds is in the level set of the point (a1 + rk(sk +
ak),−sk). The transitivity of ∼r then implies that a′ ∼r a for all (a′1, a′k) ∈
L(aj)j∈N\{1,k}(a1, ak). By Ordering and Focal Individual Monotonicity, higher
level sets of r are associated with higher level sets L(aj)j∈N\{1,k}(a1, ak).
The same procedure can be applied to b. Defining b′ and L(bj)j∈N\{1,k}(b1, bk)
by analogy to a′ and L(aj)j∈N\{1,k}(a1, ak), it follows that b
′ ∼r b for all
(b′1, b
′
k) ∈ L(bj)j∈N\{1,k}(b1, bk) and that higher level sets of r are associated
with higher level sets L(bj)j∈N\{1,k}(b1, bk). Transitivity now implies that
a r b ⇔ a1 + rkak ≥ b1 + rkbk
for all a,b ∈ F such that aj = bj for all j ∈ I \ {1, k}. Hence, the focal
individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer.
The following lemma is established by reinterpreting and adapting the
proof of Lemma 3.3.1 in d’Aspremont (1985). D’Aspremont’s lemma is con-
cerned with the properties of weighted utilitarian social objectives.
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Lemma 2. If the relation r satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual Monotonic-
ity, and Haldane, then the focal individual is an m-inclusive fitness maximizer
for all m ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer.
If n = 2, we are done. If n > 2, we complete the proof by induction.
Suppose that the focal individual is an m-inclusive fitness maximizer, where
m ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. We need to show that the focal individual is an (m+ 1)-
inclusive fitness maximizer.
It is sufficient to consider the case in which M = {1, . . . ,m + 1}. Let
a,b ∈ F be such that aj = bj for all j ∈ I \ {1, . . . ,m + 1}. Without loss
of generality, we can suppose that am+1 ≥ bm+1 (if this is not the case, then
the roles of a and b can be interchanged in the following argument). Define
c ∈ Rn by letting
cj = aj ≥ −sj ∀j ∈ I \ {1,m+ 1}, (2)
cm+1 = bm+1 ≥ −sm+1, (3)
and
c1 = a1 + rm+1(am+1 − bm+1). (4)
Because a1 ≥ −s1 and, by assumption, am+1 ≥ bm+1, it follows that c1 ≥ −s1
and, together with the inequalities in (2) and (3), we obtain c ∈ F .
Using (3) and (4), it follows that
c1 + rm+1cm+1 = a1 + rm+1am+1. (5)
By Lemma 1, the focal individual is a 2-inclusive fitness maximizer and, thus,
(4) implies
c ∼r a. (6)
It follows from (2) and (3) that cj = bj for all j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}. By the
induction hypothesis, the focal individual is an m-inclusive fitness maximizer
and, thus,
c r b ⇔
m∑
i=1
rici ≥
m∑
i=1
ribi. (7)
Because cm+1 = bm+1, (7) is equivalent to
c r b ⇔
m+1∑
i=1
rici ≥
m+1∑
i=1
ribi.
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Furthermore, by (6) and the transitivity of r,
a r b ⇔ c r b.
Thus,
a r b ⇔
m+1∑
i=1
rici ≥
m+1∑
i=1
ribi. (8)
Because cj = aj for all j ∈ I \ {1,m+ 1} and (5) holds, it follows that
m+1∑
i=1
riai =
m+1∑
i=1
rici.
Substituting this equality in (8), we obtain
a r b ⇔
m+1∑
i=1
riai ≥
m+1∑
i=1
ribi.
That is, the focal individual is an (m+ 1)-inclusive fitness maximizer.
We now use Lemma 2 to prove that the relation r satisfies Ordering,
Focal Individual Monotonicity, and Haldane if and only if the focal individual
is an inclusive fitness maximizer, as Theorem 1 asserts.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is straightforward to verify that if the focal individual
is an inclusive fitness maximizer, then r satisfies Ordering, Focal Individual
Monotonicity, and Haldane.
Now, suppose that r satisfies these three axioms. Lemma 2 states that
the focal individual is an m-inclusive fitness maximizer for all m ∈ {2, . . . , n}
if r satisfies these axioms. Setting m = n, it follows that the focal individual
is an inclusive fitness maximizer.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2. As a first step, we state a lemma,
the proof of which is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 8.1 in Bossert
and Weymark (2004) with a reinterpretation of the axioms and a change in
notation. As is the case with the lemma of d’Aspremont (1985) used above,
Bossert and Weymark’s result is expressed in terms of a weighted utilitarian
social objective. The only change needed to apply their proof here is that the
payoffs of any individual with a negative relatededness coefficient must be
replaced by the negative of this payoff. See also Theorem 4.3.1 in Blackwell
and Girshick (1954) for a related result (without the continuity axiom) in
the context of decision-making under uncertainty.
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Lemma 3. The relation r satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Domi-
nance, and Baseline Independence if and only if there exists (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn
with βi > 0 if and only if ri > 0 for all i ∈ I such that, for all a,b ∈ F ,
a r b ⇔
n∑
i=1
βiai ≥
n∑
i=1
βibi.
We next prove that r satisfies Ordering, Continuity, Payoff Dominance,
Baseline Independence, and Nepotism if and only if the focal individual is a
quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer, as Theorem 2 asserts.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is straightforward to verify that if the focal individual
is a quasi-inclusive fitness maximizer, then r satisfies Ordering, Continuity,
Payoff Dominance, Baseline Independence, and Nepotism.
Now, suppose that r satisfies these five axioms. In view of Lemma 3,
all that remains to be established is that, for all j, k ∈ I, the parameters are
such that (i) rj > rk implies βj > βk and (ii) rj = rk implies βj = βk.
Consider case (i) first. Suppose that there exist j, k ∈ I such that rj > rk.
Let a,b ∈ F and x > 0 be such that aj = ak =: a0, bj = a0 + x, bk = a0 − x,
and bi = ai for all i ∈ I \ {j, k}. Nepotism implies that b r a. By Lemma
3 and the definition of a, b, and x,
b r a ⇔
n∑
i=1
βibi >
n∑
i=1
βiai
⇔ βjbj + βkbk > βjaj + βkak
⇔ (βj + βk)a0 + (βj − βk)x > (βj + βk)a0
⇔ (βj − βk)x > 0.
Because x > 0, the last inequality implies that βj > βk.
The proof of case (ii) is similar. In this case, suppose that there exist
j, k ∈ I such that rj = rk. Defining a,b as above, Nepotism implies b ∼r a.
Replacing the inequalities with equalities in the displayed array, it follows
that
b ∼r a⇔ (βj − βk)x = 0.
Hence, βj = βk because x > 0.
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